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Malte M€uller †
Leadership is critical for the viability of rural groups. The way in which leadership is
legitimised can mediate leader and group member behaviour in the face of social
dilemmas. Yet there has been scant research on leader-follower dynamics in naturally
occurring groups. Highlighting the case of agricultural machinery circles in Tajikistan,
the effect of leading by example on investments to a collective good is studied in a
framed field experiment. To increase realism, and contrary to standard economic
experiments, this investment is a voucher allowing the group to make a real-world
machinery purchase at reduced costs. Two treatments manipulate leaders’ legitimi-
sation. Elected leaders achieve 30 per cent higher contributions to the collective
investment against a baseline version without a leader. Contributions remain, on
average, relatively stable over the course of the game. The results are discussed with
reference to the debate on external intervention in agricultural producer organisations.
Key words: field experiment, public goods game, leading by example, voting, producer
organisations, rural development.
1. Introduction
The shift from collectivised agriculture towards individual farming has paved
the way for steep increases in agricultural productivity and food production
in most post-socialist countries (Rozelle and Swinnen 2004). As agriculture
became more individualised, farm sizes decreased considerably (Lerman et al.
2004). This structural change has caused a shift in demand for rural services.
Because family farms operate at smaller scale, farms face a ‘make or buy’
decision (Williamson 2002) for agricultural inputs like machinery services.
Because rural markets often fail to supply essential services in post-socialist
economies, agricultural service cooperatives have become an alternative to
the market mechanism (Deininger 1995). These organisations allow farmers
to vertically integrate to produce and procure inputs on their own. Despite
these potential benefits, cooperative, farmer-based organisations are still
uncommon in many post-Soviet economies (Lerman 2013). Decades of forced
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collectivisation have caused a legacy of low social capital and a reluctance to
cooperate (Chloupkova et al. 2003; Fukuyama 2010, p. 18).
Leading entrepreneurs play a central role in transition processes (McMillan
and Woodruff 2002). With respect to rural areas, leadership has been
identified as a critical element for farmers’ groups. There is widespread
evidence that leadership strengthens group-formation processes and organ-
isational viability (Thorp et al. 2005). This is particularly the case for
cooperative organisations that encounter free-riding problems (Cook 1995).
Where defection is a rational strategy, and where a threshold of initial
investments is required, the experimental economics literature has shown that
leadership can increase contributions to collective goods (G€uth et al. 2007;
Rivas and Sutter 2011; Jack and Recalde 2015). In contrast, leadership can
also be a source of inefficiency and limit organisational change in cooper-
atives (Fulton 2001). Strong authoritarian leadership might be opposed to
horizontal cooperation. Thus, governance in rural groups must be ‘subject to
achieving the fine balance between leadership and domination/exploitation’
(Thorp et al. 2005, p. 912). Grossman and Baldassarri (2012) argue that the
evolution and legitimacy of leadership can help achieve this balance and
increase group cohesion, but there is still scant empirical evidence on how
leadership legitimisation impacts decision-making within rural groups.
This paper presents experimental evidence on the investment decisions of
farmers belonging to 19 machinery circles in rural Tajikistan, a former Soviet
republic. These circles recently formed and made an initial machinery
investment, which has been subsidised by a donor organisation. In a framed
field experiment, which resembles a public goods game, five members of each
circle can contribute to a new collective investment, a voucher that reduces
the circle’s costs for a future machinery acquisition. The fact that this
investment has real value increases external validity. Because the way in
which leadership emerges is critical for its legitimacy, first two mechanisms
(varying in their degree of legitimisation) to install a leader are tested against
a baseline version. Second, and to mimic the effect of the involvement of
external donor agencies, a subsidy is temporarily introduced that changes the
game structure and payoffs.
This paper contributes to the growing experimental literature in agricul-
tural economics by providing evidence on the role of leading by example in
naturally occurring groups. Because the circles might not have been formed
without outside support and subsidies, results from the experiment and group
information are linked to ongoing debates on the interference of donors and
governments in producer organisations (Chirwa et al. 2005; Shiferaw et al.
2011; Francesconi and Wouterse 2015) and on whether subsidies support
machinery investments (Huang et al. 2013).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: after background on
machinery circles (Section 2), Section 3 reviews the critical role of leadership
for cooperative groups. Section 4 details the experimental design and the
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study sample. Section 5 presents results from the experiment. A final section
discusses the results and concludes the paper.
2. Agricultural machinery circles in Tajikistan
Disadvantaged by a long, terrible civil war after the breakup of the Soviet
Union and retained early attempts at reform, Tajikistan witnessed a
significant shift towards individual farming only over the last decade
(Hofman and Visser 2014). Today, individual and family farms coexist with
collective farms in a dual structure (Hierman and Nekbakhtshoev 2018;
M€uller and Rommel 2018). Collective farms are large enough to use
agricultural machinery efficiently, but small, family farms have a cost
disadvantage. Because family farms underutilise machinery, it can only be
used efficiently if it is shared among several farms. The resulting coordination
problem could be solved by a market for service providers in which farms
could buy services instead of making them (Williamson 2002), but input
markets are only poorly developed in rural Central Asia (Akramov and
Shreedhar 2012). Reinforced by an abundance of labour, the availability and
use of agricultural machinery in rural Tajikistan diminished drastically after
independence (Lerman and Sedik 2008).
Cooperatives have been advocated as a solution when the market fails to
supply services and goods, acting as a hybrid between markets and
hierarchies (Menard 2004). By means of integration and joint investments,
cooperatives allow farmers to exploit economies of scale. In machinery
circles, farmers invest collectively in agricultural machinery, organise and
allocate machinery services among the involved farms and, in some
instances, offer services to nonmembers. Machinery circles benefit partici-
pating farmers through lower costs, greater efficiency, access to new
technology, and a greater pool of knowledge and resources (Harris and
Fulton 2000). But peak demand during sowing and harvesting periods can
create conflicts. In addition, the carelessness of some members has to be
covered by the entire group in the form of higher maintenance and repair
costs, creating a social dilemma.
Despite the potential benefits, service cooperatives are still an exception in
post-socialist rural areas (Lerman 2013), where horizontal cooperation
among farms and collective investments are less frequently observed than in
most Western countries (Bijman et al. 2012). This scarceness has been
attributed to low levels of social capital in countries where the state interfered
in all areas of production and cooperation (Chloupkova et al. 2003;
Fukuyama 2010). Particularly in agriculture, where farmers were forced for
decades to work collectively under state rule, the terms ‘cooperation’ and
‘cooperative’ have negative connotations for farmers (Gardner and Lerman
2006).
Development agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have
undertaken several efforts to support the formation of producer organisations
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in post-socialist countries. One approach, implemented by the German
Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ), was the formation of
machinery circles (‘TAMS’) in Tajikistan. In 2012 and 2013, approximately
50 circles were started, mostly in the lowland regions. The groups, which
consist of mostly five but sometimes more farmers, were each formed around
a single group leader; these leaders were expected to kick-start collective
investments. This approach followed the effort to build upon existing forms
of leadership for collective action (Ostrom 2009), incorporating the important
role of local Tajikistani leaders (rais) for addressing collective action
problems such as irrigation systems (Hill 2013). Compared to Western-style
machinery cooperatives, the organisational structure of these circles is rather
informal, but individually established statutes for each entity should regulate
contributions, usage and transactions. Machinery investments were finan-
cially supported by GIZ in the form of up to 30 per cent interest subsidies on
the initial two investments (investments by individual farmers were not
eligible). The subsidies required a minimum of 20 per cent equity capital from
each circle; the difference was financed by local bank loans. After three years,
all of the loans had been repaid on time.
It remains unclear whether a form of collective ownership emerged in these
organisations. The role of leadership is pivotal in confronting this question.
Did the support scheme serve only as a vehicle for the individual interests of
some (e.g. the leaders), or does leadership encourage more collective
investments and growth in the future? It is also an open question how
leadership is legitimised in these groups and how legitimisation affects the
decisions of nonleaders.
3. Leadership
Cooperative organisations often suffer from agency and control problems.
They also face social dilemmas (Cook 1995; Baldassarri 2015). Leadership
can have positive effects on the success and performance of farmer groups to
overcome these problems (Kaganzi et al. 2009; Baldassarri 2015). On the
other hand, leadership might be the source of organisational failure. Leaders
can obstruct organisational change if there is insufficient monitoring and
asymmetric information (Fulton 2001).
The evolution of leadership is considered a process exposing differences
between individuals to solve group coordination problems (King et al. 2009),
particularly in contexts where it is rational for individuals to defect (Glowacki
and Rueden 2015). To understand the mechanisms and dynamics of leader-
follower processes in collective action situations, laboratory economic
experiments have extensively investigated decision-making in groups (see
Moxnes and van der Heijden 2003, for one of the first studies). The framing
of leadership varies largely across studies, including situations in which
leaders can command group members’ contributions (Van Vugt et al. 2004;
Gatiso and Vollan 2017), suggest (Sahin et al. 2015) or reallocate decisions
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(van der Heijden et al. 2009; Hamman et al. 2011), and sanction and exclude
group insiders or outsiders (G€uth et al. 2007; Grossman and Baldassarri
2012). Leadership in many group processes is substantially different from
these rather authoritarian types. Often coercion is not an option, and leaders
must convince others by good example to conduct the desired actions. This
type of leadership is contrary to authority because it presupposes the
voluntariness of followership and hence has been coined ‘leading by example’
(Hermalin 1998). In a theoretical model, Hermalin shows that a leader, by
demonstrating a good example, can cause rational agents to behave
prosocially in situations where free riding is tempting. The formation of a
group mirrors these dynamics because it requires some (the leaders) to
convince others (the followers) by good example to engage in the group
process and contribute to collective investments.
Despite game-theoretic predictions, leading by example, implemented as
sequential play, can increase average contributions in voluntary contribution
mechanism public goods games (Rivas and Sutter 2011). Several factors may
variate this effect. For example, there is no evidence of an effect arising from
differences between fixed or rotating leadership roles (G€uth et al. 2007). More
importantly for this study, it has been shown that the way in which leaders
are installed has important behavioural consequences. Exogenously installed
leaders have only a small or no effect vis-a-vis no leadership. Endogenously
evolving leadership prompts contributions to public goods (Rivas and Sutter
2011), particularly in groups that successfully installed a leader through
voting (G€uth et al. 2007; Chiang and Hsu 2017). It has been argued that the
mechanism by which leaders are selected causes a legitimacy effect (Grossman
and Baldassarri 2012).
Because context is stripped away in laboratory experiments (Harrison and
List 2004), and the subject pool is not representative enough to allow
conclusions about decision-making in natural environments (Henrich et al.
2010), experiments on leadership have been recently conducted in specific
field settings. Some notable examples are Gangadharan et al. (2016), who use
a suggestion by a leader instead of an actual first move; Jack and Recalde
(2015) and M€uller et al. (2018), who both conduct (threshold) public goods
games with leading by example, but also exogenously install leaders; and
Baldassarri and Grossman (2011), who conduct a leadership-sanctioning
treatment with elections of monitors.
4. Experimental design
To test the effect of leading by example and subsidies on investment decisions
in machinery circles, the public goods game was adapted. In a paper-and-
pencil experiment, members of 19 machinery circles were repeatedly asked to
make an investment decision (with partner matching). In groups of five,
farmers had to decide anonymously between allocating money to a private
account, which was paid directly after the experiment, or investing in a new
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machinery purchase (i.e. allocating money to a group account). In each of a
total of 15 rounds, individual farmers (players) were endowed with 20
Tajikistani somoni (TJS, approximately 3 USD) and could choose from this
endowment any integer allocation between the private account and the group
account.
To reduce artificiality and increase external validity (Levitt and List 2007),
the experimental task and the commodity were more tangible than a pure
monetary payoff, just as a real-world investment would be. Most standard
public goods games misrepresent real investment decisions by paying
individual and public accounts directly. In reality, invested money is usually
‘gone’. It is bound in the investment and used to generate future income
streams. To account for this lag in the experimental design, all money that
was allocated to the group account over the course of the game was
automatically invested into a voucher for each machinery circle. Groups
received this voucher directly after the game. It was redeemable at the
machinery trader that supplied the machines for the initial investments at the
time of group formation. The voucher could only be used to buy new
machinery. To redeem the voucher, each circle had to provide written
consent, signed by all members who participated in the game. An anonymised
sample voucher can be found in the appendix (Figure S4).
In the first ten rounds, every group received a subsidy on group
investments to capture the effects of external monetary incentives for group
investments (as in the GIZ scheme). The subsidy paid a 50 per cent bonus to
investments in the group account but not to private accounts.
The game shares features of a public goods game but also has some
important differences. In laboratory or artefactual public goods games
(Harrison and List 2004), a multiplication factor usually mirrors the
additional value of an investment into a public good. Here, there is no
multiplication factor, because the voucher is part of a real investment that
generates future income streams (or reduced costs) beyond what farmers
could achieve individually. The subsidy factually multiplies contributions, but
it is introduced to mirror external monetary incentives for groups and is thus
different from the standard multiplication factor.
Unlike the public goods game, in which the social return is usually equally
distributed to all members of the group, in this game, the true benefits of new
machinery to participating farmers are not known but are assumed to be
positive for all members. Similar to other public or club good field
experiments (e.g. Carlsson et al. 2015), group members can be expected to
benefit unequally from new machinery, depending, for instance, on farm size
or agricultural practices. The game situation allows every member to make
investments according to his or her utility, which is unobserved by the
researcher.
It is individually rational to defect in the anonymous game situation
because group members can easily free ride on contributions made by
others. The potential for free riding mimics contributions in the investigated
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circles, which often lack clear rules and sanctioning mechanisms. For
example, in the investigated circles, contributions to cover investment,
maintenance and operating costs often vary and are not driven by relative
usage. The game also mimics indirectly social dilemmas in machinery
circles, where new members can free ride on previous investments, like in
other cooperatives (Cook 1995). The carelessness of some farmers when
using the machinery can create repair costs, which must be covered by the
group (Harris and Fulton 2000). Yet, following empirical evidence on
behaviour in social dilemmas (e.g. Jack and Recalde 2015) and the collective
group experience in the field, reciprocity and conditional cooperation are
presumably much better predictors of behaviour in the game than
assumptions of pure rationality.
Every session targeted one machinery circle and followed a standard
protocol. Players were asked to take a seat on chairs, which were separated
to limit communication. After a brief welcome, the experimental game was
explained verbally based on a standard protocol. The explanation included
rules on options to choose in the game, information on how groups would
receive and could redeem their voucher, three examples, and short rounds
of questions and answers to ensure comprehension. Every player received
an identification number and a folder that included sheets of paper for
decisions in the game. The experimental decisions were made as follows: at
the beginning of every round, players were asked ‘how much to contribute
from 20 TJS to the TAMS account’ (i.e. the voucher); the remainder
would be allocated to private accounts. After all decisions were made,
folders were collected and the moderator publicly announced the individual
contributions, the group investment and the additional 50 per cent subsidy
on the group investment in each round by recording this information on a
whiteboard that was visible to all. On the whiteboard, each player had an
individual player number from 1 to 5. This number did not correspond to
the identification number (a sample picture of how results were recorded
on the whiteboard can be found in the appendix: Figure S5). The
experimental protocol ensured that decisions were made privately and
anonymously. The whiteboard allowed players to learn about the history
of play of their peers.
To capture time dynamics of the real subsidy in the GIZ scheme, a first
variation of the game was introduced for all groups. After the tenth round,
players were informed (without prior notice) that the subsidy would be
withdrawn for the last five rounds. The resulting version of the game (no
leadership for all 15 rounds, withdrawal of the subsidy for rounds 11–15) is
the baseline version of the game. Consequently, and including the subsidy, a
total voucher value of 2,000 TJS ( 300 USD) was at stake for each group,
which matched approximately the cheapest machinery available at the
machinery trader (a mower).
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4.1 Leadership treatments and hypotheses
Following the baseline version of the game, two endogenous leading-by-
example treatments were introduced for a fixed proportion of groups in a
between-subjects (between-groups) design. Before round six, players in both
leadership treatments were informed that they had the option to install an
anonymous leader from the group for the remaining ten rounds of the game.1
The implications of leadership were explained to the groups (one player
decides first, his or her investment decision is reported publicly on the
whiteboard, and the following four players decide). The two leading-by-
example treatments differed in the process by which the leader obtained the
role of investing before others. In a first treatment, henceforth referred to as
bidding, all five group members could bid for leadership. Every player in the
bidding treatment received an additional 40 TJS to the private account.
Everyone could bid any amount out of this additional sum to become leader
by writing it on a separate sheet of paper; the player with the highest bid was
selected as the leader.
In the second leading-by-example treatment, henceforth referred to as
voting, group members could elect a single leader by simple majority vote,
with one vote per member, after round five. The vote was expressed by
writing the preferred player number on a prepared sheet of paper. In case of a
draw (which never ocurred), one leader would have been selected randomly.
Note that players could base their decisions to become or vote for a leader in
both treatments on the observed history of play of the first five rounds.
One can expect an increase in contributions when leading by example is
introduced in round six compared to contributions in the baseline treatment
(G€uth et al. 2007; Rivas and Sutter 2011). Following Hermalin (1998), the
other group members can form a belief based on the leader’s decision.
Because there is a potential legitimacy effect in the voting treatment,
contributions are assumed to be higher compared to the bidding treatment
for two reasons. First, players who invested more in the first five rounds are
more likely to become elected. They might then reciprocate the voting result
and maintain their higher investments or contribute even more. Second, the
legitimacy effect might as well motivate followers to contribute more by
mirroring lead decisions. It is also plausible that leaders in the bidding
treatment paid money to become a leader because they want to prompt group
contributions through higher lead investments. Because of the lower leader
legitimacy, followers are assumed to contribute less in the bidding treatment
compared to the voting treatment.
Removing the subsidy for the last five rounds is likely to cause a reduction
in contributions across treatments because individual incentives to contribute
decrease.
1 One alternative to further increase realism would have been to reveal the leader’s identity
by installing real-world leaders (Jack and Recalde 2015). The mechanism applied in this study
allowed real-world leaders to become leaders in the game while maintaining players’ privacy.
© 2020 The Authors. The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Australia,
Ltd on behalf of Australasian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc
540 M. M€uller
Contextual variables can impact investment decisions, too. Group mem-
bers who do not regularly use the circle’s machinery (or who only served to
meet the minimum of five members for group formation and financial
support) are expected to contribute less.
4.2 Sample and questionnaire
Stratified by region, 20 circles were randomly selected from among the 50
existing machinery circles. The leaders of the selected groups were informed
about the planned study and asked to inform the remaining group members
about the possibility of participating. One of the selected groups decided not
to participate. The remaining 19 groups participated in separate sessions in
October 2015 and were randomly assigned to treatments. Based on the
distribution of treatments, one sequence (only baseline, voting or bidding)
was drawn for each group without replacement. Because of the within-
variation of the leading-by-example treatments, only four groups were
assigned to the only-baseline version (Table 1).
Though some groups have more than five members, the design only included
five players for reasons of comparability (groups were informed up front and
decided which members could participate). Of the 95 players, five were women.
Participation was voluntary, and players were informed that they could leave at
any time (which no one did; there was no show-up fee). Field assistants were
trained to respond to questions and assist players who were illiterate. After the
game andbefore payments, playerswere asked to fill out a questionnaire on their
socioeconomic backgrounds, roles and positions in the group, financial
contributions, and perceived ownership, which was complemented by a small
group questionnaire. To capture time preferences, which could have affected
investment decisions in the game, the individual questionnaire contained a
nonincentivised time preference task (Andersen et al. 2008).2 Questionnaires
were available in Uzbek and Tajik. There was no deception.
Table 1 Sequence of play by different versions of the game
All groups Rounds 1-5 Rounds 6-10 Rounds 11-15
50% subsidy 50% subsidy No subsidy
BASELINE
(Four groups of five, n = 20)
No leadership
(simultaneous play)
No leadership (simultaneous
play)
BIDDING version
(Eight groups of five, n = 40)
BIDDING (sequential play)
VOTING version
(Seven groups of five, n = 35)
VOTING (sequential play)
2 Participants were asked ten times whether they preferred a hypothetical payment of 100
TJS now over a varying, higher payment in one year. The higher amount was increased from
105 TJS to 150 TJS in steps of 5 TJS. The frequency of preferring the future payment over the
immediate payment was used as a time preference measure.
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5. Results
Table 2 presents summary statistics and explains key variables. Across all
rounds and treatments, players contributed on average 10.82 TJS out of 20
TJS to the group account (i.e. contribution). This variable is used throughout
the analysis as the dependent variable. Aggregate individual contributions
over 15 rounds vary strongly from 41 TJS to 300 TJS. Voucher volumes differ
considerably across groups as well, ranging from 674 TJS to 1,895 TJS (i.e.
group voucher earned), close to the maximum amount of 2,000 TJS. The
second part of Table 2 presents data from the questionnaires.
Figure 1 suggests an overall balance in average contributions across different
versions of the game for the first five rounds. This balance remains between the
bidding and the baseline treatment in round six. After groups installed a leader
through election in the voting treatment, contributions increase in the following
rounds; these increases are sustained until the final round.
Because the main variable of interest (contribution) is not normally
distributed neither for the full sample nor within treatments (cf. Figures S1-
S3 in the appendix), only nonparametric tests are used in what follows.
Separate Kruskal–Wallis H tests for the initial five rounds do not reject the
null hypothesis of differences in the distribution of contributions between
treatments (highest Χ2 = 1.89, P = 0.39, N = 75 for round 3), indicating that
contributions to the group account in the following rounds are not driven by
the possibility of different experiences in the initial rounds.
Numerical comparisons between rounds five and six confirm the patterns in
Figure 1. While contributions in the baseline and bidding treatments change
only marginally, the installation of an elected leader in the voting treatment
has a strong impact. Contributions in the voting treatment increase on
average by 2.4 TJS (a 22 per cent increase) from round five to round six, a
difference significant at the 1 per cent level (cf. Table S1 in the Appendix S1).
This pattern is stable over time: contributions in the voting treatment are
significantly higher for the last ten rounds (compared to both other
treatments), while the differences between sequential play in the bidding
treatment and simultaneous play in the baseline version are negligible (cf.
Table S2 in the Appendix S1).
Removing the subsidy in rounds 11–15 reduces overall contributions from
11.14 TJS (SD = 4.97) in rounds six to ten to 10.65 TJS in the last five rounds
(SD = 4.95, Friedman test Χ2 = 19.66, P = 0.020). In the voting treatment,
contributions in the last five rounds remain high compared to the first five
rounds. Consequently, removing the subsidy has only a marginal negative
effect on contributions.
5.1 Leaders’ and followers’ behaviours
Figures and statistical tests presented in Table 3 provide a series of
explanations for the differences in contributions between the leadership
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treatments. Table 3 displays contributions in the first five rounds and
contributions in rounds six to ten. It also distinguishes leaders and nonleaders
(i.e. followers). The results illustrate that in the voting treatment, players
install ‘better’ leaders (i.e. players who have contributed significantly more in
the initial five rounds). The difference of more than 4 TJS to initial
contributions by players who become leaders in the bidding treatment is
significantly different from 0 at the 5 per cent level (bottom left of Table 3).
Note that there is no such difference between players who do not become
leaders in the first five rounds (P = 0.57).
Leaders in the bidding treatment increase their contributions by only 0.5
TJS, on average, after leading by example is introduced. In contrast, leaders
in the voting treatment (who have already contributed more) increase their
Figure 1 Average contributions over 15 rounds by treatments
Table 3 Contributions by game stage, leadership type and leadership role
Players who become
leaders after round 5
Test Nonleaders Test
Rounds
1-5
Rounds
6-10
Friedman
test
Rounds
1-5
Rounds
6-10
Friedman
test
BIDDING 10.75 TJS
(4.54, 40)
11.28TJS
(4.84, 40)
v2 = 9.77
P = 0.37
10.56 TJS
(4.60, 160)
9.79 TJS
(5.03, 160)
v2 = 11.78
P = 0.23
VOTING 14.87 TJS
(3.37, 35)
16.97 TJS
(2.96, 35)
v2 = 25.37
P = 0.00
10.09 TJS
(3.35, 140)
12.28 TJS
(3.88, 140)
v2 = 53.78
P = 0.00
Mixed-effects
model†
z = 2.29
P = 0.02
z = 3.08
P = 0.00
z = 0.57
P = 0.57
z = 2.44
P = 0.02
†Test statistic values refer to the coefficient of VOTING in a linear mixed-effects model with only one
independent variable; standard deviation and number of observations in parentheses.
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contributions by 2.1 TJS on average (left part of Table 3). This also affects
followers’ decisions. There is a moderate but statistically nonsignificant
decrease in followers’ contributions in the bidding treatment. Voting causes
followers not to free ride on the higher leader’s contributions but to
contribute on average 2.2 TJS more each round. In other words, the bidding
treatment selects leaders who then fail to lead, while voting selects better
leaders and increases both leaders’ and followers’ contributions. In five out of
seven cases, voting selects the real-world leader of the group as the leader in
the game, whereas in the bidding treatment, only four out of eight leaders in
the game are the real-world leaders of their respective machinery circles.
To obtain more detailed results about the effect of history of play, Table 4
presents dynamic regression models on leaders’ and followers’ decisions. In
the empirical analysis of dynamic effects over multiple rounds, it must be
acknowledged that contributions are nested within individuals, who are
nested within groups. Therefore, linear multilevel mixed-effects models, which
include random intercepts for groups and players, are employed (Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). All models use group contributions from the
previous round as a lagged explanatory variable (full models can be found in
Table S3 of the Appendix S1).
Model 1 in Table 4 uses all leaders’ contributions in the bidding and voting
treatments in rounds 6–15 as the dependent variable. It confirms that leaders
in the voting treatment contribute more than leaders in the bidding treatment
(3.02 TJS). Leaders base their contribution decisions on previous play, where
higher group contributions in the previous round increase leaders’ contribu-
tions, a pattern known from other public goods and coordination games.
Model 2 uses a subsample of all followers’ contributions in the bidding and
voting treatments in rounds 6–15. Because leaders’ contributions are higher in
the voting treatment (cf. Table 3), the model uses as an additional control
variable the interaction between voting and leader contributions. The
coefficients show that followers generally contribute more in the voting
treatment compared to the bidding treatment. Followers in both leadership
treatments reciprocate higher leader contributions, even though this effect is
limited (a 1 TJS increase in the leader’s contribution only adds 0.22 TJS more
on average to followers’ contributions). This reciprocal behaviour is not
different between the voting and bidding treatment (see the small and
nonsignificant coefficient of the interaction term in Models 2 and 3, but recall
that leaders contribute more in the voting treatment). Overall, this implies
that leaders have an important role because they can prompt moderately
higher contributions through good example (positive reciprocity) in both
treatments. Independent of this positive leadership effect, the voting
mechanism itself increases followers’ contributions compared to the bidding
treatment. Again, there is a positive effect of previous group contributions on
current investment decisions by followers (0.05 TJS). Followers also reduce
their contributions for the last five rounds in which the subsidy is removed
(0.42 TJS).
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Though leaders are anonymous, beliefs about the identity of the leader
might drive contributions. Therefore, Model 3 in Table 4 adds a dummy
variable that becomes 1 if the leader in the game is the actual leader of the
machinery circle, and 0 otherwise, and a dummy variable that becomes 1 if
players stated the belief the real-world leader was also the leader in the game,
and 0 otherwise. Model 3 shows no effect on followers’ contributions if the
real-world leader and the game leader are the same person. However, if
followers believe the game leader is the real-world leader, they contribute
more (1.29 TJS, significant at the 10 per cent level).
5.2 Individual and group heterogeneity
Two regression models adjust for heterogeneity at the individual and group
levels (Table 5). Model 1 is an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with
first-round contributions as the dependent variable. Model 2 is a linear
multilevel mixed-effects model including all players’ contributions over all
rounds (full models can be found in Table S4 of the Appendix S1).3 The
previous findings remain unaffected. Age and machinery services to outsiders
at the group level additionally affect contributions positively (significant at
the 10 per cent level).
The positive effect of approximately 2 TJS higher contributions per round
in the voting treatment is robust when individual and group covariates are
added (cf. coefficient for VOTING in Model 2 of Table 5). Eight machinery
circles have more than five members in reality. Their contributions, on
Table 4 Mixed-effects models to explain leaders’ and followers’ behaviours in the leadership
treatments
(1) (2) (3)
Leaders’
contributions
Followers’
contributions
Followers’
contributions
VOTING 3.02*** (1.02) 2.47** (1.22) 2.37* (1.41)
No subsidy 0.81 (0.50) 0.42* (0.22) 0.42* (0.22)
Leaders’ contribution 0.22** (0.09) 0.22** (0.09)
VOTING x Leaders’
contribution
0.12 (0.10) 0.13 (0.10)
Group contribution
previous round (n  1)
0.16*** (0.02) 0.05** (0.02) 0.05** (0.02)
Game leader is real leader 0.55 (0.90)
Belief that game leader is
real-world leader
1.29* (0.67)
Constant 3.53*** (0.85) 5.13*** (1.37) 4.02*** (1.37)
N 150 600 600
Log lik. 372.10 1473.31 1471.56
Wald v2 262.87 39.95 54.58
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01
3 An OLS regression was also run using the sum of a player’s contributions over 15 rounds
as the dependent variable (‘aggregate contributions’ in Table 2).
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average, are not different from five member groups over 15 rounds (Wilcoxon
Mann–Whitney U test, z = 0.316, P = 0.7521). Some of these covariates also
affect contributions. Real-world leaders of the machinery circles (real leader),
who might benefit most from the voucher, contribute significantly more over
the course of the game (roughly 40 TJS over 15 rounds on average). If
someone contributed a separate machine to the circle, he or she contributes
significantly less than others. Notably, farm size and the individual frequency
of machinery usage have no effect.4 This could imply that neither variable
adequately represents the true benefit individual farmers obtain from
machinery services, or more likely, that group members in the game do not
substantially base their contributions on individual gains (which could point
to the role of outward orientation and positive other-regarding preferences).
The coefficient for the results from the time preference task in the
questionnaire has the expected sign (a lower individual discount rate
positively affects contributions) but is statistically not significantly different
from 0. As a proxy for individual trust, the number of members stemming
from the own family has been tested as a covariate. There was no significant
effect on contributions. If the respondent states that one person in the circle
uses the machinery significantly more than others, contributions decrease
Table 5 Regression models to explore socioeconomic and group heterogeneity in investments
decisions
(1) (2)
Contribution
OLS first round
Contribution
Mixed-effects panel
VOTING 1.79*** (0.31)
BIDDING 0.28 (0.42)
No subsidy 0.49 (0.37)
Age 0.08 (0.05) 0.04 (0.03)
Education 0.06 (0.19) 0.07 (0.14)
Real leader 3.78*** (1.27) 2.54*** (0.79)
Contributed additional machinery 2.91** (1.05) 1.23** (0.57)
Farm size logged 0.09 (0.39) 0.01 (0.25)
Regular usage 0.44 (0.96) 0.36 (0.82)
Time preferences 0.20 (0.17) 0.08 (0.09)
‘One uses machinery more than others’ 2.52*** (0.69) 3.65*** (1.01)
Total machinery in circle 0.67** (0.27) 0.67*** (0.23)
Next group investment close 0.19 (0.18) 0.38** (0.18)
Regular machinery services to outsiders 0.07 (0.68) 0.95 (0.84)
Constant 9.45** (3.92) 9.15*** (2.21)
N 85 1,275
v2 161.58
Adjusted R2 0.13
Robust standard errors in parentheses, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01.
4 As an additional robustness test, household wealth was used as an explanatory variable by
the first two components of a principal component analysis of household assets. Treatment
effects and coefficients of the other covariates remain unaffected.
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significantly across all models (approximately 55 TJS over 15 rounds).
There is also the indication of a saturation effect because more machines in
the circle negatively affect contributions. The proximity of a new investment
as stated by the group also positively affects contributions.
Further analysis also reveals a pattern of conditional cooperation
(Fischbacher et al. 2001). Before the first round, players were asked to note
the expected average contribution by others (i.e. ‘How will others decide?’).
There is a significant positive association between this expectation and first-
round contributions (Spearman’s Ρ = 0.73, P = 0.00), but because the
coefficient is significantly smaller than 1, it also shows a ‘self-serving bias’
(Chaudhuri 2011, p. 52).
6. Discussion
Previous studies have shown that leadership can have heterogeneous effects in
farmers’ cooperatives (Grossman and Baldassarri 2012). Findings from 19
investigated machinery circles confirm this result by showing that a leadership
effect is conditional on the way in which leaders are installed.5 Elected leaders
and followers contribute more on average than players in a self-made-leader
treatment. Here, it could be argued that the bidding mechanism creates an
additional endowment effect because all followers in the bidding treatment
receive 40 TJS more to their private accounts. Yet stake sizes in social
dilemma games have not been found to significantly affect contributions in a
specific direction.
Disentangling the leadership effect further, it is unimportant whether
actual leaders or nonleaders obtain a leadership role, and it is only decisive
how they become leaders, which could be used as an argument for rotating
leadership through regular elections of managers/leaders in Tajikistani
machinery circles, which are an important prerequisite towards more
democratically controlled cooperative structures (Dunn 1988).
Average contributions remained relatively stable over the course of the
game, which has been observed as well in laboratory experiments on leading
by example (G€uth et al. 2007; Rivas and Sutter 2011). Compared to both
other versions, voting could increase average contributions by roughly 30 per
cent ( 3TJS, 15 per cent of the endowment per round), and bidding had no
effect. This is overall a somewhat smaller magnitude compared to other
experimental studies in this field, where leading by example sometimes
increases contributions by up to 50 per cent or more (Levati et al. 2007). The
comparatively low-magnitude effect might be driven by the fact that
contributions in the baseline version were already high. Repeating this study
5 A further study with more investigated groups could also vary the sequence of the
leadership treatments, where some groups start with and some without leaders. Cross-checking
with measures assessing the external validity of such games could help to further increase
realism.
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in the laboratory could help to find out whether this laboratory–field
difference remains. In addition, individual risk preferences and trust could be
elicited by separate experimental tasks to explain further variations in
contributions.
In the experiment, farmers could earn a considerable amount of money by
not contributing (up to 340 TJS, approximately 50 USD to the private
account, though it was beyond the control of the experiment to know whether
any of the private accounts were later also used for group machinery
investments). In the last stage of the game, without the subsidy, incentives to
defect were high. Despite these strong incentives, participants contributed on
average more than half of their endowment to the group account, and the
three highest-contributing groups achieved vouchers equivalent to 1,452 TJS,
1,542 TJS and 1,895 TJS (the last in the bidding treatment). The positive
effects of legitimised leadership and a relatively high and constant prevalence
of cooperative behaviour in the simultaneous version are signs that circles
may be able to overcome the collective action problems inherent to those
organisations.
The successful production of rural services is important in Tajikistan,
which is land-locked, constrained by a lack of agricultural land, and
experiencing rapid population growth. Machinery circles can improve the
supply of rural services by offering services to group members and
nonmembers, as some of the investigated groups already do. Tajikistan is
still witnessing larger collective farm structures as remnants of the Soviet
system, and many farmers are reluctant to start individual farming. Better
access to inputs, like (more efficient) machinery services, would reduce the
costs to leave collective farms. If farmers in Tajikistan could select their
preferred type of farming dependent on more market-oriented prices for
inputs and outputs (Hierman and Nekbakhtshoev 2018; M€uller and Rommel
2018), efficient and optimal farm structures could evolve more easily (Lerman
et al. 2004).
This paper indicates that rural groups can address collective action
problems when leaders are legitimised through elections. Considering the
external validity of the leader-election effect, one must consider the possibility
of selection bias. Farmers in the existing machinery circles might have self-
selected into the subsidy program because they are different from other
farmers in Tajikistan. They might be in favour of democracy and free
elections (although regular elections of leaders in machinery circles have not
been observed in the field during this study). In consequence, further group
support schemes would have to focus more on capacity building during
processes of group formation. Only a new study could examine the claim of a
selection bias directly by repeating this study design, particularly the leader-
election treatment in other social dilemma settings (e.g. irrigation) and with
farmers who are not organised in farmers’ groups or associations.
Results from the experiment are also relevant for a growing body of
literature on the role of financial and technical assistance for the development
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of farmers’ groups (Francesconi and Wouterse 2015) and community-driven
projects (Fearon et al. 2009; Navarra and Vallino 2015) and the question
whether machinery subsidies in general induce more investments (Huang
et al. 2013). The initial financial subsidy through which the machinery circles
were formed was intended as a seed fund for further investments under
collective property and as a stepping-stone towards the development of
formal cooperative organisations. Some of the investigated circles seem
dominated by one person, which resulted in lower contributions by others.
There is even one group member who was stated not to have any agricultural
land. It is likely that the subsidy in these groups was just a windfall gain for
one or more farmers without further group investments. In other groups, the
initial real subsidy triggered high contributions years later during the time of
the study. Some of the presented models suggest that contributions decreased
moderately after the subsidy has been dropped in the game, particularly in the
voting treatment, but did not go below initial contributions in the first
rounds. It remains unclear whether this reduction is due to final-round effects.
Only further observations of the groups (or more repetitions in an additional
experiment) can shed light on how those groups behave in the long term.
The generally high contributions in the game can be viewed as an
indication of group cohesion and possible future investments under collective
ownership. The survey data of the machinery circles also show that many
groups have a growing machinery pool. Given the fact that structural change
only happens at a slow pace and that rural service markets are only poorly
established in Tajikistan, some of the groups would not have been formed
without the initial subsidy. It is also a positive sign for cooperative principles
that leader elections prompt investments in an otherwise authoritarian
environment. Despite past failure, one should not give up easily on thinking
about new ways to organise support for the formation of service cooperatives
in other transition economies that lack efficient markets for rural services.
This study highlights the role of contextual factors, such as the legitimacy of
local leaders, to successfully support producer groups.
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